Equally-distributed equivalent utility, ex post egalitarianism and Utilitarianism by Grant, Simon et al.
18 February 2011
Equally-Distributed Equivalent Utility,
Ex Post Egalitarianism and Utilitarianism
Abstract
We provide an axiomatization of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility social welfare functions in
the context of Harsanyis impartial observer theorem. For this family of social welfare functions, we show
what additional axiom is necessary and su¢ cient for the observer to exhibit aversion to ex post inequality.
We also relate this axiomatization to our axiomatization in a companion paper of generalized utilitarian
social welfare functions. Given certain richness assumptions, the only social welfare functions that belong
to both families are the utilitarian.
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1 Introduction
In a companion paper (Grant et al, [6]), we revisited the setting of Harsanyis [10, 11] utilitarian
impartial observer theorem in which a society of individuals I has to choose among di¤erent social
policies, each of which induces a probability distribution or lottery` over a set of social states
X . Each individual i has preferences %i over these lotteries. These preferences are known, and
they di¤er.
To help choose among social policies, Harsanyi [10] proposed that each individual should
imagine herself as an (impartial) observer who does not know which person she will be. That is,
the observer faces not only the real lottery ` over the social outcomes in X , but also a hypothetical
lottery z over which identity in I she will assume. In forming preferences % over all such extended
lotteries, the observer is forced to make interpersonal comparisons; for example, she is forced to
compare being person i in social state x with being person j in social state x0.
Harsanyi assumed that when the observer imagines herself being person i she adopts person
is preferences over the outcome lotteries. He also assumed that all individuals are expected
utility maximizers, and that they continue to be so in the role of observer. Harsanyi argued that
these Bayesian rationalityaxioms force the observer to be a utilitarian. More formally, over all
extended lotteries (z; `) in which the identity lottery and the outcome lotteries are independently
distributed, the observers preferences admit a representation of the form
V (z; `) =
X
i
ziUi (`) , (1)
where zi is the probability of assuming person is identity and Ui (`) :=
Z
X
ui (x) ` (dx) is person
is von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility for the outcome lottery `. By xing the identity
lottery in (1) to be the equal-chance lottery zu = (1=I; : : : ; 1=I), the observer can use V (zu; ) to
obtain an impartialranking of the outcome lotteries (and hence, the associated social policies).1
1 This is essentially the method Weymark [18] uses to obtain an impartial ranking over social policies in
his formalization of Harsanyis impartial observer theorem. As an alternative, Gajdos and Kandils [5] totally
ignorantobserver considers all possible distributions over individuals to derive a ranking over social policies that is
a weighted average of Harsanyis utilitarian and Rawlsegalitarian criteria. Roemer [15] observes that such notions
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In our companion paper, we restricted attention to product lotteries, 4 (I)  4 (X ), and,
more signicantly, only required each of Harsanyis axioms to hold on a (further) restriction of
this domain. In particular, we required the observer to satisfy a form of mixture independence only
for mixtures of two product lotteries in which the outcome lottery was the same. In conjunction
with a richness assumption, this yielded a generalized utilitarian representation of the form:
V (z; `) =
X
i
zii (Ui (`)) , (2)
where zi is again the probability of assuming person is identity and Ui (`) is again person is
expected utility from the outcome lottery `, but each i (:) is a (possibly non-linear) transformation
of person is expected utility.2 This allowed us to accommodate two objections that have been
raised against Harsanyis utilitarian impartial observer: one concerning ex ante fairness that is
similar to Diamonds [3] critique of Harsanyis [11] aggregation theorem; and one concerning
di¤erent attitudes toward risk.
Fleurbaey [4] raises another objection to Harsanyis utilitarianism which also applies to the
generalized utilitarian representation in (2). To illustrate his objection, consider two individuals,
i and j and three social outcomes xi, xj and x. Person i strictly prefers outcome xi to outcome xj
and is indi¤erent between x and a (1/2,1/2) lottery over states xi or xj : that is, ui (xi) > ui (xj)
and 12ui (xi) +
1
2ui (xj) = ui (x). Person j strictly prefers outcome xj to outcome xi and is also
indi¤erent between x and a (1/2,1/2) lottery over states xi or xj : that is, uj (xi) < uj (xj) and
1
2uj (xi)+
1
2uj (xj) = uj (x). Perhaps, there is some (possibly indivisible) good, and xi is the state
in which person i gets the good; xj is the state in which person j gets it, while x is a state in which
neither receives the good but each gets some compromise alternative that each rates equivalent
(in terms of her own risk preferences) to a lottery that gives her an equal chance of getting or not
getting the good. Finally, suppose the observer is indi¤erent to: (i) being i getting xi and being
j getting xj ; (ii) being i getting x and being j getting x; and, (iii) being i getting xj and being
of impartiality reduce any consideration of social justice to simply one of rational prudence on the part of the
observer. He, among others, contends that this constitutes an inadequate basis for a theory of social justice. We
do not take a position on this here as the issues it raises are beyond the scope of this paper.
2 See Grant et al [6], Theorem 1. Again by xing the identity lottery to be the equal-chance lottery, the observer
can use the representation in (2) to obtain an impartialranking of the outcome lotteries and the associated social
policies.
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j getting xi.
Consider the two extended (product) lotteries illustrated in tables (a) and (b), in which rows
are the people and columns are the outcomes.
xi x xj xi x xj
i 1=4 0 1=4 i 0 1=2 0
j 1=4 0 1=4 j 0 1=2 0
(a) (b)
In each, the observer has an equal chance of being person i or person j. In table (a), the observer
has an equal chance of being in state xi or state xj , but whichever of these two social states
obtains, one person will get the good and the other will miss out. In table (b), state x obtains
with probability 1, that is, each individual receives the compromise alternative. Given the
assumptions we made in the previous paragraph for our generalized utilitarian observer, she must
be indi¤erent between these two extended lotteries since by applying the generalized utilitarian
representation in (2), we obtain:
V ((a)) =
1
2
i

1
2
Ui (xi) +
1
2
Ui (xj)

+
1
2
j

1
2
Uj (xi) +
1
2
Uj (xj)

=
1
2
i (Ui (x)) +
1
2
j (Uj (x)) = V ((b)) .
Following Fleurbaeys reasoning, one might argue that an observer who is concerned about
inequality should express a (strict) preference for the extended lottery (b) over (a), since the former
results in no inequality ex post according to the interpersonal comparisons of the individuals
welfare implicit in the observers preferences over extended lotteries, while the latter results in
certain ex post inequality. In the setting of Harsanyis [11] aggregation theorem, he proposes an
alternative to generalized utilitarianism that he calls the expected equally-distributed equivalent-
utility maximizing.
In our setting, the expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility representation takes the form:
V (z; `) =
Z
' 1 (
P
i zi' (Ui (x))) ` (dx) , (3)
where the function ' () plays a similar role as the i () functions in (2), that is, translating each
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person is von Neumann expected utility to the observers expected utility for identity lotteries.
Unlike the case of the generalized utilitarian, however, the observers expected utility of the
identity lottery z for a given social state x is translated back, using the inverse mapping ' 1,
so that it corresponds to the ex post utility level that if obtained for certain by every individual
would be regarded by the observer as being equivalent to the distribution induced by z of ex
post welfares for that social state. The expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility is thus
obtained by summing (more precisely, integrating) the probability weighted equally-distributed
equivalent-(ex post) utilities.3
The main aim of this paper is to characterize, in the setting of Harsanyis impartial observer
theorem, the class of observers who admit a representation of the form in (3). We provide such
an axiomatization in section 3.
As its name suggests, the expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility representation bears
a close resemblance to Atkinsons [2] equally-distributed equivalent income function for ranking
income distributions and Rothschild-Stiglitzs [16] certainty-equivalent function for ranking lot-
teries over money/wealth. For these representations, the degree of concavity of the functions that
are analogous to the function ' in (3) measure the degree of aversion to income inequality and the
degree of aversion to risk, respectively. We show in section 4 that the concavity of ' corresponds
to a notion of aversion to ex post inequality by the observer in the sense that a strict preference
for the extended lottery described in table (b) over the extended lottery described in table (a)
follows if ' is concave. Furthermore, we show that the same axiom on the observers preferences
in Grant et al [6] that induced a generalized utilitarian observer to exhibit a concern about ex ante
fairness is also su¢ cient (and necessary) for the ' function in (3) to be concave. This provides
an intriguing link between what it takes for a generalized utilitarian to exhibit an ex ante pref-
erence for fairness and for an expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility maximizer to display
an aversion to ex post inequality.
3 Analogous to what Weymark (1991) showed can be done with the utilitarian representation, by xing the
identity lottery to be the equal-chance lottery, the observer can use the representation in (3) to obtain an impartial
ranking of the outcome lotteries and the associated social policies. A di¤erent approach was taken by Karni and
Weymark (1998), whose domain consists of equal-chance identity lotteries only (but di¤erent individuals may face
di¤erent social alternative lotteries). As this domain does not include identity lotteries in which the observer can
be a given individual with certainty, Karni and Weymark had to strengthen Harsanyis principle of acceptance.
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Finally, in section 5, we consider an observer who satises both sets of axioms (including both
independence properties) that characterize the generalized utilitarian and the expected equally-
distributed equivalent-utility maximizer. A natural conjecture is that this would be enough to
induce utilitarianism. It turns out that this is not quite enough, and we illustrate the gap with
an example. However, if there are three or more agents, then under some mild richness conditions
on the preferences, it is indeed only utilitarians who reside in the intersection of the set of gener-
alized utilitarians and the set of expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility maximizers. This
provides a new axiomatization of utilitarianism.
2 Set up and Notation
Let society consist of a nite set of individuals I = f1; : : : ; ng, n  2, with generic elements i and
j. The set of nal outcomes or social states is denoted by X with generic element x. The set X
is assumed to have more than one element and to be a compact metrizable space and associated
with it is the set of events E , which is taken to be the Borel sigma-algebra of X . Let 4 (X ) (with
generic element `) denote the set of outcome lotteries; that is, the set of probability measures on
(X ; E) endowed with the weak convergence topology. With slight abuse of notation, we will let x
or sometimes [x] denote the degenerate outcome lottery that assigns probability weight 1 to social
state x.
Each individual i in I is endowed with a preference relation %i dened over the set of outcome
lotteries 4 (X ). We assume throughout that for each i in I, the preference relation %i is a
complete, transitive binary relation on 4 (X ), and that its asymmetric part i is non-empty. We
assume these preferences are continuous in that weak upper and weak lower contour sets are closed.
Hence, for each %i there exists a non-constant continuous function Vi : 4 (X ) ! R, satisfying
for any ` and `0 in 4 (X ), Vi (`)  Vi (`0) if and only if ` %i `0. In summary, a society may be
characterized by the tuple

X ; I; f%igi2I.
In Harsanyis story, an observer imagines herself behind a veil of ignorance, uncertain about
which identity she will assume in the given society. Let 4 (I) denote the set of identity lotteries
on I. Let z denote the typical element of 4 (I), and let zi denote the probability assigned by the
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identity lottery z to individual i. They represent the imaginary risks in the mind of the observer
as she conducts thought experiments in which she envisages assuming the identity of someone else.
With slight abuse of notation, we will let i or sometimes [i] denote the degenerate identity lottery
that assigns probability weight 1 to the observer assuming the identity of individual i.
As discussed above, we assume that the outcome and identity lotteries faced by the observer
are independently distributed; that is, she faces a product lottery (z; `) 2 4 (I)  4 (X ). We
refer to this as an identity-outcome lottery or, where no confusion will arise, simply as a product
lottery.
The observer is endowed with a preference relation % dened over 4 (I)4 (X ). We assume
throughout that % is complete, transitive continuous (in that weak upper and weak lower contour
sets are closed in the product topology), and that its asymmetric part  is non-empty, and so it
admits a (non-trivial) continuous representation V : 4 (I)4 (X )! R. That is, for any pair of
product lotteries, (z; `) and (z0; `0), (z; `) % (z0; `0) if and only if V (z; `)  V (z0; `0).
As we noted in the introduction above, % and its representation V (; ) explicitly involve
interpersonal comparisons. For example, V (i; x) > V (j; x0) means the observer assesses that it is
better to be person i in social state x than person j in social state x0. Hence, for each x, we can
view the vector (V (1; x) ; : : : ; V (n; x)) as the distribution across individuals of interpersonally-
comparable utilities associated with that social state.4
As discussed in the introduction, we have the following special families of preferences.
Utilitarianism The observer is a utilitarian if her preferences % admit a representation of the
form
V (z; `) =
nX
i=1
ziUi(`),
where, for each individual i in I, Ui : 4 (X )! R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-
utility representation of %i; i.e., Ui (`) :=
Z
X
Ui (x) ` (dx).
(Ex Ante) Generalized Utilitarianism The observer is an (ex ante) generalized utilitarian if
4 In Fleurbaey [4], social states are not explicitly modelled. Rather, there are states of the worldwith given
probabilities and the data are state-contingent distributions of ex post utilities across individuals. The utilities are
assumed to be interpersonally comparable.
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her preferences % admit a representation

fUi; igi2I of the form
V (z; `) =
nX
i=1
zii (Ui(`)) ,
where, for each individual i in I, i : R ! R is a continuous, increasing function, and
Ui : 4 (X )! R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-utility representation of %i.
Also discussed in the introduction is the following representation for an observer that can
exhibit Fleurbaeys [4] notion of aversion to ex post inequality.
Expected Equally-Distributed Equivalent Utility The observer is an expected equally-distributed
equivalent-utility maximizer if her preferences % admit a representation

fUigi2I ; ' of the
form
V (z; `) =
Z
X
' 1 (
Pn
i=1 zi' (Ui (x))) ` (dx) ,
where, ' : R ! R is a continuous, increasing function, and for each individual i in I,
Ui : 4 (X )! R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-utility representation of %i.
3 Expected Equally-Distributed Equivalent-Utility
In this section, we provide an axiomatization of an expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility
maximizer.
The rst axiom is Harsanyis acceptance principle. For degenerate product lotteries of the
form (i; `) or (i; `0), the observer knows she will assume identity i for sure. The acceptance prin-
ciple requires that, in this case, the observers preferences % must coincide with that individuals
preferences %i over outcome lotteries.
Acceptance Principle. For all i in I and all `; `0 2 4 (X ), ` %i `0 if and only if (i; `) % (i; `0).
Second, we assume that the observers preferences satisfy independence for certain mixtures
of product lotteries. Note we need to be careful. The set of product lotteries 4 (I)  4 (X ) is
not a convex subset of 4 (I  X ) and hence not all probability mixtures of product lotteries are
well dened. We rst dene an independence property that is a restriction of the one introduced
in Grant et al [6].
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Independence over Identity Lotteries with Degenerate Outcome Lotteries. Suppose (z; x),
(z0; x0) 2 4 (I)  X are such that (z; x)  (z0; x0). Then, for all ~z, ~z0 2 4(I): (~z; x) %
(~z0; x0) if and only if (~z + (1  ) z; x) % (~z0 + (1  ) z0; x0) for all  in (0; 1].
To understand the mechanics of this axiom, rst notice that the two mixtures on the right side
of the implication are identical to (~z; x)+(1  ) (z; x) and (~z0; x0)+(1  ) (z0; x0), respectively.
These two mixtures of product lotteries are well dened: they mix identity lotteries holding the
social state (that is, degenerate outcome lottery) xed.5 Second, notice that the two product
lotteries, (z; x) and (z0; x0), that are mixed inwith weight (1  ) are themselves indi¤erent. The
axiom states that mixing intwo indi¤erent lotteries (with equal weight) preserves the original
preference between (~z; x) and (~z0; x0) prior to mixing.
As the product lotteries being mixed hold the social state xed, there is no uncertainty about
each individuals ex post utility. Thus, the product lotteries being mixed are essentially equivalent
from the perspective of an ex post egalitarian. The only uncertainty that is to be resolved con-
cerns which particular identity the observer will assume. As the domain of this randomization is
purely hypothetical, coupled with the fact that the ex post utilities of the individuals are already
determined, standard arguments made against independence with regard to fairness or inequality
aversion considerations do not seem to apply, so the axiom postulates that independence over
identity lotteries holds in this restricted (but arguably, intuitive) domain.
We next consider a dualindependence property that holds for mixtures of outcome lotteries
holding the identity lotteries xed.6
Independence over Outcome Lotteries (for the Observer). Suppose (z; `), (z0; `0) 2 4 (I)
4 (X ) are such that (z; `)  (z0; `0). Then, for all ~`, ~`0 2 4(X ): (z; ~`) % (z0; ~`0) if and only
if (z; ~`+ (1  a) `) % (z0; ~`0 + (1  a) `0) for all  in (0; 1].
Now the product lotteries being mixed hold the identity lottery xed, so the mixing concerns
5 In Grant et al [6], the axiom applies holding xed any outcome lottery, not just a degenerate outcome lottery
as is done here.
6 More properly speaking, this axiom is dual to the independence over identity lotteries that was the key axiom
in the characterization of the generalized utilitarian impartial observer in Grant et al [6].
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the uncertainty associated with which social outcome will obtain. Thus, the axiom essentially
requires that if the identity lottery is xed, then the observer should exhibit an independence
property analogous to what is required from an individual whose preferences over outcome lotteries
are expected utility. Indeed, if the observer satises acceptance, then this independence entails
that the preferences of each individual satisfy the standard independence of expected utility:
Independence over Outcome Lotteries (for Individual i). For all `, `0 and `00 in 4 (X ),
` %i `0 if and only if `+ (1  ) `00 %i `0 + (1  ) `00 for all  in (0; 1].
Hence, we have the individuals are expected utility maximizers and thus each %i admits a von
Neumann-Mogernstern representation.
Proposition 1 Suppose that % satises acceptance and independence over outcome lotteries, then
for all i in I, %i satises independence over outcome lotteries.
Proof. Fix `, `0 and `00 in 4 (X ) and  in (0; 1]. By acceptance, ` %i `0 if and only
if (i; `) % (i; `0) and ` + (1  ) `00 %i `0 + (1  ) `00 if and only if (i; `+ (1  ) `00) %
(i; `0 + (1  ) `00). But applying independence over outcome lotteries, we have (i; `) % (i; `0) if
and only if (i; `+ (1  ) `00) % (i; `0 + (1  ) `00). Hence, ` %i `0 if and only if `+(1  ) `00 %i
`0 + (1  ) `00. Since  can be any value in (0; 1], the result holds.
To obtain our representation result, we work with two richness conditions on the domain of
individual preferences. The rst entails that none of the outcomes under consideration are Pareto
dominated. The second entails that there are no dominatedidentity lotteries.
Absence of Unanimity over Outcomes For all x; x0 2 X , if x i x0 for some i in I, then
there exists j in I such that x0 j x.
Redistributive Scope For all z; z0 in 4 (I), if (z; x)  (z0; x) for some x in X , then there exists
x0 in X such that (z0; x0)  (z; x0).
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Absence of Unanimity over Outcomes is perhaps a natural restriction in the context of Harsanyis
thought experiment. The whole exercise is motivated by the need to make social choices when
agents disagree. We do not need to imagine ourselves as an observer facing an identity lottery to
rule out an outcome that every individual agrees is dominated by some other outcome, that is,
that is Pareto dominated. We contend that this should still hold even if the observer may have
concerns about ex post inequality. In fact, in his setting, Fleurbaey [4] explicitly requires that
social preference over constant acts respect the Pareto ordering.7
Redistributive scope, on the other hand, rules out the case where one individual is always
worse o¤ than another (from the perspective of the observer) regardless of the outcome. There
are many economic contexts in which this condition will be met.8
These axioms are su¢ cient to yield an expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility repre-
sentation.
Theorem 2 Suppose that absence of unanimity over outcomes and redistributive scope apply.
Then, the observer satises acceptance, independence over identity lotteries with degenerate out-
come lotteries and independence over outcome lotteries if and only if her preferences % admit a
representation of the form
V (z; `) =
Z
X
' 1 (
P
i zi' (Ui (x))) ` (dx) ,
where, for each individual i in I, Ui : 4 (X ) ! R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-
utility representation of %i; and ' : R ! R is a continuous, increasing function. Moreover, the
composite functions '  Ui are unique up to common a¢ ne transformations.
The proof is in the appendix but we provide here a sketch. We begin by noting that as a
corollary to a result from another companion paper (Grant et al, [7]), it follows that in the presence
of absence of unanimity over outcomes, acceptance and independence over identity lotteries with
degenerate outcome lotteries yields a generalized utilitarian representation restricted to 4 (I) 
7 In Grant et al [6], the observer was not concerned with ex post inequality per se, so we required absence of
unanimity to hold for all outcome lotteries, not just outcomes (that is, degenerate outcome lotteries).
8 However, there are other contexts in which the condition will fail. For example, in The House at Pooh Corner,
readers might prefer to be Tigger than to be Eyeore regardless of the outcome (Milne, [13]).
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X of the form:
V^ (z; x) =
P
i ziWi (x) . (4)
By adding outcomeindependence, it follows that all the functions Wi are common monotonic
transformations of each individuals expected utility function Ui. This in turn allows us to express
a version of the representation given in (4) in which Wi (x) = '  Ui (x). Finally by extending
this to all product lotteries in 4 (I)  4 (X ), we obtain the the expected equally-distributed
equivalent-utility representation in (3).
4 Ex Post Egalitarianism
The only restrictions placed by the axioms in Theorem 2 on the shape of the function ' from
the expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility representation are that it is continuous and
increasing. In a standard utilitarian social welfare function, each Ui-function maps individual
is income to an individual utility. These incomes di¤er across people, and concavity of the
Ui-functions is associated with egalitarianism over incomes. In the expected equally-distributed
equivalent-utility representation, the function ' maps individual is ex post utility Ui (x) to the
ex post utility of the observer. These ex post utilities may di¤er across people, and concavity
of the '-functions is associated with egalitarianism over ex post utilities, often called ex post
egalitarianism.9 To see the relevance of this for Fleurbaeys notion of ex post inequality aversion,
recall from the introduction the two identity-outcome lotteries presented in tables (a) and (b),
which correspond to 
1
2
[i] +
1
2
[j] ;
1
2
[xi] +
1
2
[xj ]

and

1
2
[i] +
1
2
[j] ; x

,
respectively. Recall also, each individual is indi¤erent between the outcome lottery 12 [xi] +
1
2 [xj ]
and the (degenerate) outcome lottery x, and the observer is indi¤erent between: (i) being i getting
xi and being j getting xj ; (ii) being i getting x and being j getting x; and, (iii) being i getting
xj and being j getting xi. Following Fleurbaeys line of argument, this implies that an ex post
9 See, for example, Harel, Safra and Segal [8] and Fleurbaey [4].
11
egalitarian should express the strict preference
1
2
[i] +
1
2
[j] ; x



1
2
[i] +
1
2
[j] ;
1
2
[xi] +
1
2
[xj ]

, (5)
since the former identity-outcome lottery results in no inequality ex post, while the latter results
in certain ex post inequality.
To see how a strictly concave ' leads to our expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility
maximizing observer exhibiting the desired strict preference expressed in (5), rst notice that
V (i; xi) = V (j; xj) implies that ' 1  ' (Ui (xi)) = ' 1  ' (Uj (xj)), that is, Ui (xi) = Uj (xj)
whether or not ' is concave. Similarly, V (i; x) = V (j; x) and V (i; xj) = V (j; xi) imply that
Ui (x) = Uj (x) and Ui (xj) = Uj (xi), respectively.
With a strictly concave ', however, the observer will express the strict preference:
i;
1
2
[xi] +
1
2
[xj ]



1
2
[i] +
1
2
[j] ; xi

. (6)
This follows since
V

1
2
[i] +
1
2
[j] ; xi

= ' 1 

1
2
' (Ui (xi)) +
1
2
' (Uj (xi))

< ' 1  '

1
2
Ui (xi) +
1
2
Uj (xi)

, (since ' is strictly concave and Ui (xi) > Uj (xi) )
=
1
2
Ui (xi) +
1
2
Ui (xj) = V

i;
1
2
[xi] +
1
2
[xj ]

.
Notice that
V

1
2
[i] +
1
2
[j] ; x

= ' 1 

1
2
' (Ui (x)) +
1
2
' (Uj (x))

= ' 1  ' (Ui (x)) = 1
2
Ui (xi) +
1
2
Ui (xj) = V

i;
1
2
[xi] +
1
2
[xj ]

,
where the second equality follows from the assumption that Ui (x) = Uj (x). Hence, we have,
V

1
2
[i] +
1
2
[j] ;
1
2
[xi] +
1
2
[xj ]

=
1
2
' 1 

1
2
' (Ui (xi)) +
1
2
' (Uj (xi))

+
1
2
' 1 

1
2
' (Ui (xj)) +
1
2
' (Uj (xj))

= ' 1 

1
2
' (Ui (xi)) +
1
2
' (Uj (xi))

[since Ui (xj) = Uj (xi) & Uj (xj) = Ui (xi)]
= V

1
2
[i] +
1
2
[j] ; xi

.
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Combining these last two sets of inequalities with (6) implies the strict preference in (5).
We will show that concavity of the function ' is equivalent to an axiom that we introduced
in Grant et al [6] to enable a generalized utilitarian observer to exhibit a concern about (ex
ante) fairness that is similar to Diamonds [3] critique of Harsanyis aggregation theorem. In
the discussion above, we showed that a (strictly) concave ' led the expected equally-distributed
equivalent-utility maximizing observer to exhibit the preference in (6). The axiom we propose
may be viewed as a generalization of this expression of preference. To explain the axiom, suppose
the observer is indi¤erent between the identity-outcome lotteries (z; `0) and (z0; `). Consider now
a product lottery (z; `) that (in general) lies in a di¤erent indi¤erence set. There are two ways
to randomize between these indi¤erence sets while remaining in the set of product lotteries. The
product lottery (z; `+ (1  ) `0) randomizes between these indi¤erence sets in outcome lotteries
(i.e., real life chances); while the product lottery (z + (1  ) z0; `) randomizes between these
indi¤erence sets in identity lotteries (i.e., imaginary accidents of birth). We argued in Grant
et al [6] that a preference for fairness corresponds to preferring a randomization between these
indi¤erence sets in outcome lotteries (i.e., real life chances) to a randomization in identity lotteries
(i.e., imaginary accidents of birth).
Preference for Life Chances. For any pair of identity lotteries z and z0 in 4 (I) and any
pair of outcome lotteries ` and `0 in 4 (X ), if (z; `0)  (z0; `), then (z; `+ (1  ) `0) %
(z + (1  ) z0; `) for all  in (0; 1).
Adding this axiom to the conditions of Theorem 2 yields the desired property for '.
Proposition 3 (Concavity) Suppose that absence of unanimity over outcomes and redistributive
scope apply. Then, an expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility maximizing observer with
representation

fUigi2I ; ' exhibits preference for life chances if and only if ' is concave.
Notice if we strengthened the axiom Preference for Life Chances so that (z + (1  ) z0; `) %
(z; `+ (1  ) `0) held as well, or equivalently we required the observer to be indi¤erent between
these two identity-outcome lotteries, then the corresponding proposition would require ' to be
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a¢ ne. And by taking an appropriate normalization, we see that such an observers preferences are
utilitarian. In the next section, we consider an alternative way the axioms can be strengthened to
induce (full) utilitarianism.
5 Independence along both margins and Utilitarianism.
In Grant et al [6], we assumed the observers preferences satised the strengthening of Absence
of Unanimity over Outcomes that requires none of the outcome lotteries under consideration are
Pareto dominated.
Absence of Unanimity For all `; `0 2 4 (X ), if ` i `0 for some i in I, then there exists j in
I such that `0 j `.
Given preferences that satisfy absence of unanimity, we showed in Theorem 1 of Grant et al
[6] that acceptance, independence over outcome lotteries for each individuals preferences and the
following independence property characterized ex ante generalized utilitarianism.
Independence over Identity Lotteries. Suppose (z; `), (z0; `0) 2 4 (I)4 (X ) are such that
(z; `)  (z0; `0). Then, for all ~z, ~z0 2 4(I): (~z; `) % (~z0; `0) if and only if (~z+(1  ) z; `) %
(~z0 + (1  ) z0; `0) for all  in (0; 1].
A natural question is whether (given the richness conditions, redistributive scope and absence of
unanimity) acceptance, independence over identity lotteries and independence over outcome lot-
teries are enough to induce utilitarianism. An observer might satisfy both independences because
she views the two types of randomization symmetrically if independence applies to one margin,
then perhaps it should apply to the other without taking a direct position on whether the two
types of randomization are equivalent.
It turns out, however, that acceptance and both of these independence properties are not
enough to induce utilitarianism. In fact, we can see this with a simple example similar to the one
that appeared in the introduction. Once again, suppose that there are two individuals, i and j,
and two states, xi and xj , denoting which agent is given a (possibly indivisible) good. Suppose
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that the observers preferences again satisfy (i; xi)  (j; xj) and (i; xj)  (j; xi). Suppose that
both individuals satisfy independence. Specically, for any outcome lottery `, player is expected
utility is given by Ui (`) = ` (xi) ` (xj) and player js expected utility is given by Uj (`) = ` (xj) 
` (xi). Hence, Ui (xi) = Uj (xj) = 1 and Ui (xj) = Uj (xi) =  1. Let the observers preferences be
given by the expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility representation
V (z; `) := ` (xi)'
 1 (zi   zj) + ` (xj)' 1 (zj   zi) ,
where the function ' is given by:
' (u) =
8>><>>:
um for u  0
  ( u)m for u < 0
, for some m > 0.
By Theorem 2, it follows the observers preferences satisfy acceptance, independence over outcome
lotteries and independence over identity lotteries with degenerate outcome lotteries. It is less
obvious that they satisfy (full) independence over identity lotteries, but this can be readily seen
by considering the monotonic transformation
V^ (z; `) := '  V (z; `) = '   [` (xi)  ` (xj)]' 1 (zi   zj)
= zi' (Ui (`)) + zj' (Uj (`)) .
V^ is a generalized utilitarian representation. Hence, it follows from Grant et al [6] that the
preferences satisfy independence over identity lotteries as well.
These preferences even have the property (similar to utilitarianism) that if the observer thinks
she is equally likely to be either person, then she is indi¤erent as to who gets the good. But these
preferences do not satisfy utilitarianism unless m = 1. To see this, notice that these preferences
fail to exhibit indi¤erence between life chances and accidents of birth. For example, we have
(i; xi)  (j; xj), but (i; xi + (1  )xj)  ( [i] + (1  ) [j] ; xi) except in the special case when
 = 12 .
Nevertheless, the intuition that independence along both margins should imply utilitarianism
is correct. If there are three or more agents, then under some mild richness conditions on the
preferences, the combination of identity independence, outcome independence and acceptance do
imply utilitarianism.
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The example shows that the two richness conditions we have used so far, redistributive scope
and absence of unanimity, are not enough. But they are close. The '-function in the example is
a homogenous function. Again, this is general: Lemma 9 in the appendix shows that if we start
from a generalized utilitarian representation with a common -function, then independence over
outcome lotteries implies that this common -function is always homogenous; that is homogeneity
is necessary. But homogeneity is not su¢ cient except in very special cases. Notice in the example
that the point of inection of the homogenous '-function (the zero) occurs exactly at outcome
lottery ^`, where ^`(xi) = 1=2. For this outcome lottery, the observer is indi¤erent over which
identity lottery she faces. This is a very knife-edge property, and it can be ruled out in a
number of ways. The following extra richness condition su¢ ces.
Three-Player Richness For all outcomes x; y in X and all  in [0; 1], there exist individuals
i and j in I such that (i;  [x] + (1  ) [y])  (j;  [x] + (1  ) [y]).
Given redistributive scope, three-player richness implies that there must be at least three individ-
uals. In words, it says that there is no outcome lottery involving just two outcomes at which the
observer is indi¤erent over all the possible identities she could assume. In the example above, the
condition was violated at ^`, where ^`(xi) = 1=2, since the observer was indi¤erent between being
either person there. If we add a third person k to the example, then the condition would be met
provided that either the outcome lottery at which the observer is indi¤erent between being person
i or person k or the outcome lottery at which she is indi¤erent between being person j or person
k is not exactly equal to 1=2.10
With this extra condition in place (and hence troublesome examples like the example above
ruled out), the symmetric richness conditions and symmetric independence axioms over identity
and outcome lotteries yield Harsanyis utilitarianism.
Theorem 4 (Utilitarianism) Suppose that absence of unanimity, redistributive scope and three-
player richness all apply. Then, the following are equivalent:
10 Notice that if there are three or more possible outcomes, the condition still only places restrictions for lotteries
involving just two. In particular, there still could be some lottery in the interior of the simplex where the observer
is indi¤erent as to identity. The condition would, however, be violated if there were divisible and disposable private
goods and (hence) some outcome that equalized the welfare of all individuals. In that setting, however, since the
outcome set is itself very rich, we can anyway induce a su¢ ciently rich set of utility lotteries.
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(a) The observer satises the acceptance principle, independence over identity lotteries and in-
dependence over outcome lotteries.
(b) There exist a continuous function V : 4 (I) 4 (X ) ! R that represents % and, for each
i in I, a function Ui : 4 (X ) ! R that is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected-utility
representation of %i such that for all (z; `) in 4 (I)4 (X ),
V (z; `) =
Z
X
 
IX
i=1
ziUi(x)
!
` (dx) .
Moreover the functions Ui are unique up to common a¢ ne transformation.
The proof is in the appendix. The example discussed above shows that three-player richness
is essential.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 2 (Ex Post Generalized Utilitarianism): It is immediate that the
preferences generated by the representation satisfy the axioms. We will show that the axioms
imply the representation
Step 1. Generalized Utilitarian Representation of % restricted to 4 (I)  X . The
following lemma is a corollary of Theorem 1 in Grant et al [7]. This Theorem establishes a
representation of the preferences that is a¢ ne in identity lotteries. Since we only assume the inde-
pendence over identity lotteries for identity-outcome lotteries that are degenerate in the outcome
lottery, the a¢ ne representation need only hold for % restricted to 4 (I)X .
Lemma 5 (A¢ ne Representation 1) Suppose that absence of unanimity over outcomes holds.
Then, % satises the acceptance principle and independence over identity lotteries with degenerate
outcome lotteries if and only if there exist a continuous function W : 4 (I)  X ! R that
represents % restricted to 4 (I) X and, for each individual i in I, a function Wi : 4 (X ) ! R
that represents %i restricted to X , such that for all (z; x) in 4 (I)X ,
W (z; x) =
IX
i=1
ziWi(x): (7)
Moreover, the functions Wi are unique up to common a¢ ne transformations.
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The uniqueness of the functionsWi follows because absence of unanimity implies the restriction
of % to 4 (I)  X satises the following property that we showed in the proof of Theorem 1 in
Grant et al [7] guarantees uniqueness of the a¢ ne representation in (7).
Property U For each non-extreme (wrt %) identity lottery/outcome pair (z; x) in 4 (I)  X ,
there exists an outcome y in X and two individuals i and j in I such that (i; y)  (z; x) 
(j; y).
To show that this property holds, consider any non-extreme (with respect to %) (z; x) 2
(I)  X . Let (z^; x^) be maximal with respect to % and (z0; x0) be minimal with respect to
% on (I)  X . These maxima and minima exist because % is continuous and both (I)
and X are compact. Because (z^; x^) is maximal, by independence over lotteries with degenerate
outcomes, there exists an i 2 I such that (i; x^)  (z^; x^). Similarly, there exists a j 2 I such that
(j; x0)  (z0; x0). (It could be that z^ is the degenerate identity lottery [i] or that z0 is the degenerate
identity lottery [j].) Because (z; x) is non-extreme, we therefore have (i; x^)  (z; x)  (j; x0). If
(i; x^)  (i; x0), the result follows by setting y = x0. Otherwise, (i; x^)  (i; x0) and, therefore,
x^ i x0 by acceptance. By absence of unanimity over outcomes, there then exists a k 2 I such
that x0 k x^. By acceptance, (k; x0)  (k; x^). If (z; x)  (k; x0), then (i; x^)  (z; x)  (k; x^)
and the proof is complete. Otherwise, we have (k; x0)  (z; x)  (j; x0) and again the proof is
complete.11
Step 2. A¢ ne in outcome lotteries representation of %.
First we show, given redistributive scope, we need at most two identity lotteries z1 and z2, to
coverthe entire range of the observers preferences in the following sense: for all product lotteries
(z; `) either (z; `)   z1; `0 for some `0, or (z; `)  (z2; `00) for some `00, or both. Moreover the set
of product lotteries for which bothapplies are not all indi¤erent.
To state this more formally, let the identity lotteries z1 and z2 (not necessarily distinct) and
outcome lotteries `1; `2 (not necessarily distinct) be such that
 
z1; `1
  (z2; `2) and such that 
z1; `1

% (z; `) % (z2; `2) for all product lotteries (z; `). That is, the product lottery
 
z1; `1

is
11 We thank John Weymark for providing us with this compact and elegant proof.
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weakly better than all other product lotteries, and the product lottery (z2; `2) is weakly worse than
all other product lotteries. And let the outcome lotteries `1 and `2 (not necessarily distinct) be such
that
 
z1; `1

%
 
z1; `

%
 
z1; `1

for all product lotteries
 
z1; `

, and
 
z2; `
2

% (z2; `) % (z2; `2)
for all product lotteries (z2; `). That is, given the identity lottery z1, the outcome lottery `1 is
(weakly) worse than all other outcome lotteries; and, given the identity lottery z2, the outcome
lottery `2 is (weakly) better than all other outcome lotteries. The existence of these special lotteries
follows from the continuity of %, the non-emptiness of , and the compactness of  (I) (X ).
Moreover, by independence over outcome lotteries, we can take `1; `1; `2; and `2 each to be a
degenerate outcome lottery. Let these be x1, x1, x2, and x2, respectively. This in turn means that
by independence over identity lotteries with degenerate outcome lotteries, we can take z1 and z2
each to be a degenerate identity lottery. Let these be i1 and i2, respectively.
The following result follows from an analogous argument used in Grant et al [6] to prove
their Lemma 7 (also called spanning). The roles of identities and outcomes are reversed and
redistributive scope here plays the role that axiom of absence of unanimity played there.
Lemma 6 (Spanning) Assume redistributive scope applies and that the observer satises accep-
tance and independence over outcome lotteries. Let i1; i2; x1; x1; x2; and x2 be dened as above.
Then, (a) either
 
i1; x1
  (i2; x2) or  i2; x2   i1; x1 or  i2; x2   i1; x1 and (b) for all
product lotteries (z; `), either
 
i1; x1

% (z; `) %
 
i1; x1

or
 
i2; x
2

% (z; `) % (i2; x2) or both.
Proof. (a) If i1 = i2, then the rst two cases both hold. Otherwise, suppose that the rst two
cases do not hold; that is,
 
i1; x1
  (i2; x2) and  i1; x1   i2; x2. By the denition of x1,
we know that
 
i1; x2

%
 
i1; x1

, and hence
 
i1; x2
  (i2; x2). Using redistributive scope and
acceptance, there must exist another outcome x 6= x2 such that (i2; x) 
 
i1; x

. Again by the
denition of x1, we know that
 
i1; x

%
 
i1; x1

, and hence (i2; x) 
 
i1; x1

. By the denition
of x2, we know that
 
i2; x
2

% (i2; x), and hence
 
i2; x
2
   i1; x1, as desired. Part (b) follows
immediately from (a). 
With Lemma 6 in hand, we can now construct the a¢ ne in outcome lottery representation of
%. The construction is analogous to one used in the proof of Lemma 8 in Grant et al [6] with
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the roles of identities and outcomes reversed and absence of unanimity replaced by redistributive
scope.
Lemma 7 (A¢ ne Representation 2) Suppose redistributive scope applies. Then, the observer
satises the acceptance principle and independence over outcome lotteries if and only if there
exist a continuous function V : 4 (I)  (X ) ! R that represents % and is a¢ ne in its second
argument.
Proof. Let i1; i2; x1; x1; x2; and x2 be dened as in Lemma 6 above. Given continuity, an immedi-
ate consequence of Lemma 6 is that, for all product lotteries (z; `), either (z; `)   i1; `0 for some
`0, or (z; `)  (i2; `00) for some `00 or both. Moreover, we can choose the `0 such that its support
only contains outcomes x1 and x1. And similarly for `00 with respect to outcomes x2 and x2.
The proof of lemma now proceeds with two cases.
Case (1) The easiest case to consider is where i1 = i2. In this case,
 
i1; x1
   i1; x1 and 
i1; x1

% (z; `) %
 
i1; x1

, for all (z; `). Then, for each (z; `), let V (z; `) be dened by
 
i1; V (z; `)

x1

+ (1  V (z; `)) [x1]
  (z; `) :
By continuity and independence over outcome lotteries, such a V (z; `) exists and is unique.
To show that this representation is a¢ ne, notice that if
 
i1; V (z; `)

x1

+ (1  V (z; `)) [x1]
 
(z; `) and
 
i1; V (z; `0)

x1

+ (1  V (z; `0)) [x1]
  (z; `0), then independence over outcome lotteries
implies (i1; [V (z; `) + (1  )V (z; `0)] x1+[1 V (z; `) (1  )V (z; `0)] [x1])  (z; `+ (1  ) `0).
Hence V (z; `) + (1  )V (z; `0) = V (z; `+ (1  ) `0), as required.
Case (2). If
 
i1; x1
  (i2; x2), then  i1; x1 % (z; `) %  i1; x1 for all (z; `) and hence case
(1) applies. Similarly, if
 
i2; x
2
   i1; x1, then  i2; x2 % (z; `) % (i2; x2) for all (z; `), and
again case (1) applies (with i2 in place of i1). Hence suppose that
 
i1; x1
   i2; x2 and that 
i1; x1
  (i2; x2). Then, by Lemma 6,  i1; x1   i2; x2   i1; x1  (i2; x2); that is, we have
two overlapping intervals that spanthe entire range of the observers preferences.
Then, just as in case (1), we can construct an a¢ ne function V 1(; ) to represent the observers
preferences % restricted to those (z; `) such that
 
i1; x1

% (z; `) %
 
i1; x1

, and we can construct
20
an a¢ ne function V 2(; ) to represent % restricted to those (z; `) such that  i2; x2 % (z; `) %
(i2; x2). We can then apply an a¢ ne re-normalization of either V 1 or V 2 such the (re-normalized)
representations agree on the overlap
 
i2; x
2

% (z; `) %
 
i1; x1

. Since V 1(; ) and V 2(; ) are
a¢ ne, the re-normalized representation is a¢ ne. 
Step 3. Combining the representations obtained in Steps 1 and 2.
In summary, we have shown from Step 1 that W (z; x) =
P
i ziWi (x) represents % restricted
to 4 (I)  X and from Step 2 that V (z; `) is a representation of % that is a¢ ne in `, that is,
V (z; `) =
R
V (z; x) ` (dx).
For i = 1; : : : ; I, set Ui (`) := V ([i]; `). By acceptance, it follows that Ui (`) is a(n expected
utility) representation of %i.
Notice that Wi (x) is a monotonic transformation of Ui (x). Let ' :

V (i2; x2) ; V
 
i1; x1
 !
Wi2 (x2) ;Wi1
 
x1

be the monotonic transformation implicitly dened by Wi (x) = ' Ui (x).12
Also notice that V (z; x) is a monotonic transformation ofW (z; x). Let  :

W (i2; x2) ;W
 
i1; x1
!
V (i2; x2) ; V
 
i1; x1

, implicitly be dened by V (z; x) =  W (z; x).
By construction we have, for any i 2 I and any x 2 X , V (i; x) =  Wi (x) =   '  Ui (x).
Hence  = ' 1. Putting this all together we obtain,
V (z; `) =
Z
' 1 W (z; x) ` (dx) =
Z
' 1
 X
i
ziWi (x)
!
` (dx)
=
Z
' 1
 X
i
zi'  Ui (x)
!
` (dx) ,
as desired. 
Proof of Proposition 3 (Concavity)
Concavity ) Preference for Life-Chances.
Suppose (z; `0)  (z0; `). Using the fact that the representation is a¢ ne in its second argument,
we have V (z; `+ (1  ) `0) = V (z; `) + (1  )V (z; `0). Using the fact that (z; `0)  (z0; `),
the last expression is equal to V (z; `) + (1  )V (z0; `). But the concavity ' implies that ' 1
12 For a given i, Ui (X ) may only be a subset of the domain of '. However, by Lemma 6, it is clear that a single
' can be used for the entire domain.
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is convex, and so,
V (z; `) + (1  )V (z0; `)
=
Z "
' 1 
 X
i
zi' (Ui (x))
!
+ (1  )' 1 
 X
i
z0i' (Ui (x))
!#
` (dx)

Z
' 1 
 X
i
[zi + (1  ) z0i]' (Ui (x))
!
` (dx)
= V (z + (1  ) z0; `) .
Hence, the observer exhibits a preference for life chances. 
Preference for Life-Chances ) Concavity
If ' 1 is not convex, then there exist v < w in the domain of ' 1 (i.e., the set(X
i
zi' (Ui (x)) : z 2 4 (I) ; x 2 X
)
which by the richness conditions is an interval of the form

' (Ui2 (x2)) ; '
 
Ui1
 
x1

) such that
' 1 (v) + (1  )' 1 (w) < ' 1 (v + (1  )w)
holds for some  in (0; 1). Note that the continuity of ' implies that the set of pairs (v; w) satisfying
this inequality is an open set. Moreover, there exists u 2 (v; w) and " > 0 such that the inequality
is satised for all v0 2 (u   "; u) and w0 2 (u; u+ ").13 Fix such v0 and w0. By denition, there
exists an identity lottery z and an outcome x such that
P
i zi' (Ui (x)) = v
0 (or, equivalently,
V (z; x) = ' 1 (v0)). Without loss of generality, all zi > 0 and not all Ui (x) are the same.14
Hence, for " su¢ ciently small there exists an identity lottery z0 satisfying
P
i z
0
i' (Ui (x)) = w
0
(and V (z0; x) = ' 1 (w0)). Choose x00 such that
P
i zi' (Ui (x
00)) is equal to some v00 6= v0 (if,
for all x00,
P
i zi' (Ui (x
00)) = v0, then, as not all individualspreferences agree on the order of
the outcomes, a slight change in z would allow it). Without loss of generality v00 > v0. Consider
13 Let a be the maximal a for which the intersection of the line a + bt, b = '
 1(w) ' 1(v)
w v , and the graph of
' 1 over (v; w) is non empty. Then, u is the minimal t such that
 
t; ' 1 (t)

is a tangency point of a + bt
14 If some zi = 0, then v0 can be slightly changed. If Ui (x) = Uj (x) for all i; j, then
P
i z
0
i' (Ui (x)) is independent
of z0 and, by absence of unanimity, a slight change in v0 gives x0 for which Ui (x0) 6= Uj (x0) for some i; j (otherwise
there is a unanimus preference of x over x0, or vice versa)
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` = (1  ) [x] +  [x00]. Then,
V (z; `) = (1  )' 1
 X
i
zi' (Ui (x))
!
+ ' 1
 X
i
zi' (Ui (x
00))
!
= (1  )' 1 (v0) + ' 1 (v00) .
Hence, if " is chosen su¢ ciently small so that w0 < v00, then there exists 0 such that `0 = 
1  0 [x] + 0 [x00] satises V (z; `0) = ' 1 (w0). Summarizing,
V (z0; x) = ' 1 (w0) = V (z; `0) and (z0; x)  (z; `0)
But then we would have (for some  in (0; 1)),
V (z;  [x] + (1  ) `0) = V (z; x) + (1  )V (z; `0)
= ' 1 (v0) + (1  )' 1 (w0) < ' 1 (v0 + (1  )w0)
= ' 1
 X
i
[zi + (1  ) z0i]' (Ui (x))
!
= V (z + (1  ) z0; x) ,
a violation of preference for life chances. 
Proof of Theorem 4 (Utilitarianism). It is clear that (b) implies (a). We will show (a))(b).
We observed in Grant et al [6, p. 1955] that independence over outcome lottteries implies a
property we called indi¤erence between individuals facing similar risks. It thus follows from
Theorem 1 and Proposition 6 in Grant et al [6, p. 1947 and p. 1952, respectively] that the
preferences may be represented by a generalized utilitarian representation with common utility
transformation function, that is, V (z; `) =
PI
i=1 zi
h
U^i(`)
i
. It is enough to show that this
common -function is a¢ ne. Since the proof is long, we will break it into 6 steps, and we will
signpost some parts.
Step 1 is to prove the following lemma that shows the function  1  V is a¢ ne on 4 (X ), from
which it immediately follows that
V^ (z; `) =
Z
X
 1  V (z; [x]) ` (dx)
=
Z
X
 1
Pn
i=1 zi

U^i (x)

` (dx)
is an expected equally-distributed equivalent-utility representation of the observers preferences.
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Lemma 8 Suppose that absence of unanimity and redistributive scope both apply, and that the
observer satises the acceptance principle, independence over outcome lotteries and independence
over identity lotteries. Let V and  be dened so that, V (z; `) =
PI
i=1 zi
h
U^i(`)
i
and V represents
the observers preferences. Then, for each z in 4 (I), the function  1  V (z; ) : 4 (X ) ! R is
a¢ ne.
Proof. Fix an identity lottery z and an individual i. Let bUi  R be the interval such that
u 2 bUi implies that there exists an ` such that U^i (`) = u. We will rst show that  1  V (z; )
is a¢ ne on the inverse image of bUi; that is, on the subset of outcome lotteries f` 2 4 (X ) :
 1  V (z; `) 2 bUig. If this inverse image is empty, then a¢ nity is trivial. Hence, consider two
outcome lotteries `; `0 (not necessarily distinct) such that  1V (z; `) 2 bUi and  1V (z; `0) 2 bUi.
By the denition of bUi, there exist two outcome lotteries ` and `0 such that  1  V (z; `) = U^i  `
and  1  V (z; `0) = U^i
 
`0; that is, (z; `)   i; ` and (z; `0)   i; `0. Applying independence
over outcome lotteries yields
(z; `+ (1  ) `0)   i; `+ (1  ) `0
for all  in [0; 1]. Hence,  1  V (z; `+ (1  ) `0) 2 bUi. Applying the representation yields:
 1  V (z; `+ (1  ) `0) = U^i
 
`+ (1  ) `0
= U^i
 
`

+ (1  ) U^i
 
`0 (by a¢ nity of U^i)
=  1  V (z; `) + (1  ) 1  V (z; `0) .
where the third equality is by the denition of ` and `0. This argument holds for all i.
An immediate consequence of Lemma 6 is that there exist two individuals i1 and i2 such that
range

 1  V (z; )  bUi1 [ bUi2 and the inverse image of bUi1 [ bUi2 is  (X ). We know that
 1  V (z; ) is a¢ ne on the inverse image of bUi1 and bUi2 . Moreover, by Lemma 6, the interior ofbUi1i2 (= interior bUi1 \ bUi2) is not empty. Hence  1  V (z; ) is a¢ ne on  (X ). This argument
holds for all z. 
It follows from Lemma 7 in Grant et al [6, p. 1960] that absence of unanimity, acceptance and
independence over identity lotteries imply there exist individuals i1; i1; i2 and i2 (not necessarily
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distinct) and outcome lotteries `1 and `2 (also not necessarily distinct) such that (i)
 
i1; `1
 
(i2; `2) and such that
 
i1; `1

% (z; `) % (i2; `2), for any product lottery (z; `), (ii) either
 
i1; `
1
 
(i2; `2) or
 
i2; `2
   i1; `1 or  i2; `2   i1; `1, and (iii) for any product lottery (z; `) either 
i1; `1

% (z; `)%
 
i1; `
1

or
 
i2; `2

% (z; `)% (i2; `2) or both. Now since we also have independence
over outcome lotteries we can take each `1 and `2 to be a degenerate outcome lottery. Let these
be x1 and x2.
Recall that, given our representation with a common -function, (i; `)  (j; `0) implies U^i(`) =
U^j(`
0). Hence, from (ii) either U^i1(x
1) = U^i2(x2) or U^i2(x2) = U^i1(x
1) or U^i2(x2) > U^i1(x
1).
Notice that for all product lotteries (z; `), we have  1  V (z; `) =  1
P
i zi
h
U^i (`)
i
2h
U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1
i[hU^i2 (x2) ; U^i2 (x2)i. We will rst concentrate on the interval hU^i1  x1 ; U^i1  x1i,
but we will return to the interval
h
U^i2 (x2) ; U^i2 (x2)
i
in Step 5. If U^i1
 
x1

= U^i1
 
x1

, then a¢ n-
ity of  1  V (z; ) on the interval
h
U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1
i
is trivial.15 Hence, assume U^i1
 
x1

<
U^i1
 
x1

.
Dening x^ and u. Since
 
i1; x1
   i1; x1, by redistributive scope, there exists an outcome x^
such that (i1; x^) 
 
i1; x^

. Consider the outcome lotteries `[] dened by `[] :=  [x^]+(1  )

x1

.
By the continuity of both U^i1 and U^i1 , there must exist an outcome lottery ` (:= `[]) such that 
i1; `
   i1; `. Let u be given by
u :=  1

V
 
i1; `

=  1

V
 
i1; `

(8)
The level of utility u is going to be important in the argument below. By the denition of x1, if
u does not lie in the interval
h
U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1
i
, then u < U^i1
 
x1

.
Step 2 is to show that, for all u0 and u00 2
h
U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1
i
and all  and  in [0; 1],
 1 [ [u0 + (1  ) u] + (1  ) [u00 + (1  ) u]]
=  1 [ (u0) + (1  ) (u00)] + (1  ) u. (9)
To show this, x u0 and u00 2
h
U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1
i
. Denote by z0 = 0

i1

+
 
1  0 [i1]
and z00 = 00

i1

+
 
1  00 [i1], the identity lotteries with support just on i1 and i1 for which
15 In this case, U^i2 (x2) = U^i1 (x
1) and hence showing that  is a¢ ne on [U^i2 (x2); U^i2 (x2)] would be enough.
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 1

V
 
z0; x1

= u0 and  1

V
 
z00; x1

= u00. Also x  and  in [0; 1], and dene u by:
u :=  1

V
 
z0 + (1  ) z00; x1 . (10)
By the denition of u and the fact that V is a¢ ne in identity lotteries, we have
u =  1

V
 
z0 + (1  ) z00; ` . (11)
By lemma 8, the function  1 V (z0 + (1  ) z00; ) is a¢ ne on  (X ), hence combining expres-
sions (10) and (11), we get
 1

V
 
z0 + (1  ) z00;  x1+ (1  ) ` = u + (1  ) u (12)
Our two a¢ nity properties allow us to expand the left side of this expression . First, by the
a¢ nity of V
 ;  x1+ (1  ) ` on  (I), we get
V
 
z0 + (1  ) z00;  x1+ (1  ) `
= V
 
z0; 

x1

+ (1  ) `+ (1  )V  z00;  x1+ (1  ) `
= 

 1  V  z0;  x1+ (1  ) `+ (1  )  1  V  z00;  x1+ (1  ) ` (13)
Second, by the a¢ nity of  1  V (z0; ) and  1  V (z00; ) on  (X ), we have

 1  V  z0;  x1+ (1  ) ` =  1  V  z0; x1+ (1  ) 1  V  z0; ` (14)
and
 1  V  z00;  x1+ (1  ) ` =  1  V  z00; x1+ (1  ) 1  V  z00; ` . (15)
Substituting u0 =  1 V  z0; x1, u00 =  1 V  z00; x1 and u =  1 V  z0; ` =  1 V  z00; `,
expressions (14) and (15) become
[u0 + (1  ) u] and [u00 + (1  ) u] ,
respectively. Substituting these back into expression (13) and then substituting back into the left
side of expression (12) yields
 1 [ [u0 + (1  ) u] + (1  ) [u00 + (1  ) u]] = u + (1  ) u. (16)
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Using the denition of u in expression (10) and the a¢ nity of V
 ; x1 on  (I), we have
u =  1

V
 
z0 + (1  ) z00; x1
=  1

V
 
z0; x1

+ (1  )V  z00; x1
=  1


 
 1

V
 
z0; x1

+ (1  )   1 V  z00; x1
=  1 [ (u0) + (1  ) (u00)] (17)
where the last line follows from the denitions of u0 and u00. Substituting expression (17) back
into expression (16) yields expression (9), as desired. Our choice of u0; u00;  and  was arbitrary,
so this completes step 2. 
Re-normalization. Recall that functions
h
U^i
i
i2I
are unique only up to a common a¢ ne trans-
formation and that the composite functions
h
  U^i
i
i2I
are also unique only up to a common
a¢ ne transformation. Hence, we can re-normalize such that the utility level u = 0. With slight
abuse of notation, we will continue to use  and
h
U^i
i
i2I
to denote these re-normalized functions.
With this re-normalization, expression (9) becomes
 1 [ (u0) + (1  ) (u00)] =  1 [ (u0) + (1  ) (u00)] . (18)
Since u0 and u00 were arbitrary, expression (18) holds (for all  and  in [0; 1]) for all utility pairs
in the (re-normalized) interval
h
U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1
i
. Recall that 0 need not lie in this interval.
Step 3 is to show that expression (18) also holds (for all  and  in [0; 1]) for all utility pairs u0
and u00 in
h
0; U^i1
 
x1
i
even if 0 < U^i1
 
x1

; that is, even if u does not lie in
h
U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1
i
.
To show this, we will establish that expression (18) holds in each interval in a sequence of intervals
I0; I1,. . . , with (i) I0 :=
h
U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1
i
; (ii) In \ In+1 an interval with positive length (and
so having a non-empty interior), for all n = 0; 1; : : :; and (iii)
[1
n=0
In =

0; U^i1
 
x1
i
. The
continuity of  () then implies that (18) holds on all of
h
0; U^i1
 
x1
i
.
Fix an ~ 2 (0; 1) for which ~U^i1
 
x1

> U^i1
 
x1

(> ~U^i1
 
x1

). Set In :=
h
~nU^i1
 
x1

; ~nU^i1
 
x1
i
.
By construction, In \ In+1 is an interval with positive length and
[1
n=0
In =

0; U^i1
 
x1
i
. To
see that In satises (18), consider a pair of utilities u0 and u00 in In and x ;  in [0; 1]. By
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construction, both u^0 := u0=~n and u^00 := u00=~n are in
h
U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1
i
. Since ~n and ~n
are in [0; 1], expression (18) implies
 1 [ (~nu^0) + (1  ) (~nu^00)] = ~n 1 [ (u^0) + (1  ) (u^00)] (19)
and
 1 [ (~nu^0) + (1  ) (~nu^00)] = ~n 1 [ (u^0) + (1  ) (u^00)] . (20)
Substituting u0 for ~nu^0 and u00 for ~nu^00 and then combining expressions (19) and (20), we obtain
 1 [ (u0) + (1  ) (u00)] =  1 [ (u0) + (1  ) (u00)] ,
as required. 
Step 4 consists of the following lemma showing that  must be an a¢ ne transformation of a
homogenous function.
Lemma 9 Suppose that  () satises equation (18) for all u0; u00 in
h
min
n
0; U^i1
 
x1
o
; U^i1
 
x1
i
and all  and  in [0; 1], then
 (u) =

Cuk +D u  0
 C ( u)k +D u < 0
for some C; k in R++ and some D in R.
Case 1.16 U^i1
 
x1
  0. We shall show that
 (u00)   (u0) =  () [ (u00)   (u0)] . (21)
for all u0; u00 2
h
0; U^i1
 
x1
i
and all  2 (0; 1).
Consider four positive numbers u1, u^1, u2, u^2 in
h
U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1
i
such that u1 < u^1 and
u2 > u^2. Suppose (contra-hypothesis) that for some  2 (0; 1),
 (u1)   (u^1)
 (u2)   (u^2) 6=
 (u1)   (u^1)
 (u2)   (u^2) =:  r. (22)
16 The proof draws on Moulins [14, p. 45] proof of Roberts [17] theorem that a social welfare ordering that is
additively separable and independent of a common utility scale admits a generalized utilitarian representation with
a power function.
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Then we have,
 1

1
1 + r
 (u1) +
r
1 + r
 (u2)

=  1

1
1 + r
 (u^1) +
r
1 + r
 (u^2)

.
And (22) implies that
 1

1
1 + r
 (u1) +
r
1 + r
 (u2)

6=  1

1
1 + r
 (u^1) +
r
1 + r
 (u^2)

.
But (18) implies (setting  = 1= (1 + r))
 1

1
1 + r
 (u^1) +
r
1 + r
 (u^2)

=  1

1
1 + r
 (u^1) +
r
1 + r
 (u^2)

,
and
 1

1
1 + r
 (u1) +
r
1 + r
 (u2)

=  1

1
1 + r
 (u1) +
r
1 + r
 (u2)

,
leading to a contradiction. Hence, (21) obtains.
The continuous, increasing solutions of (21) are known (Aczel [1987, Chap. 2]) to be
 (u) = C+uk
+
+D+
for some C+; k+ in R++ and some D+ in R.17
Case 2. 0 2

U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1

. By an analogous argument to the one employed in Case 1, for
u in the sub-interval
h
0; U^i1
 
x1
i
, we obtain  (u) = C+uk
+
+ D+; and for u in the sub-intervalh
U^i1
 
x1

; 0
i
 R , we obtain  (u) =  C  ( u)k
 
+D , for some C ; k  in R++ and some D 
in R. Continuity of  implies that D+ = D  =: D. Thus we obtain:
 (u) =
8>><>>:
C+uk
+
+D u  0
 C  ( u)k  +D u < 0
. (23)
It remains to show that k+ = k  and C+ = C .
To show that k+ = k , we again exploit expression (18). Consider u0; u00 2

U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1

such that u0 < 0, u00 > 0. Then, for any ;  in (0; 1),
 (u0) + (1  ) (u00) =  C  ( u0)k  + (1  )C+ (u00)k+ +D
and
 (u0) + (1  ) (u00) =  C  ( u0)k  + (1  )C+ (u00)k+ +D.
17 Aczel [1987] does not include 0 in the domain of (21). If 0 is excluded, then (21) has a logorithmic solution
and a solution in which both C+ and k+ are both negative.
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Choose ;  in (0; 1), such that
 C  ( u0)k  + (1  )C+ (u00)k+ > 0 and   C  ( u0)k  + (1  )C+ (u00)k+ > 0.
Therefore, on the left side of (18) we have
 1 ( (u0) + (1  ) (u00)) =
 
 C k  ( u0)k  + (1  )C+ (u00)k+
C+
!1=k+
and on the right side of (18) we have
 1 ( (u0) + (1  ) (u00)) = 
 
 C  ( u0)k  + (1  )C+ (u00)k+
C+
!1=k+
=
 
 C k+ ( u0)k  + (1  )C+ (u00)k+
C+
!1=k+
.
This is possible only if k+ = k  =: k.
It only remains to show that C+ = C . Recall that by redistributive scope and independence
over outcome lotteries, there exists an outcome x^ such that U^i1 (x^) > U^i1 (x^). We used this fact
to construct u. Case 2 (i.e., u = 0 2

U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1

) corresponds to the situation in which
U^i1 (x^) > 0 > U^i1
 
x1

.
Recalling the notation we used to dene u, set `[] :=  [x^]+(1  )

x1

. By independence over
outcome lotteries and our construction, U^i1
 
`[]

is linear and decreasing in , and is positive at
 = 0 and negative at  = 1; and U^i1
 
`[]

is linear and increasing in , and is negative at  = 0 and
positive at  = 1. Recall that  corresponds to u; that is, `[] =
`and U^i1

`[]

= U^i1

`[]

= 0.
By outcome independence,  is implicitly given by
U^i1 (x^) +
 
1   U^i1  x1 = 0 = U^i1 (x^) +  1   U^i1  x1 . (24)
Using (24) we can write for  > , U^i1
 
`[]

= U^i1 (x^)
 
   =  1   and U^i1  `[] =
U^i1 (x^)
 
   =  1  , and so,
U^i1
 
`[]

U^i1
 
`[]
 = U^i1 (x^)
U^i1 (x^)
.
Similarly, for  < , U^i1
 
`[]

= U^i1
 
x1
  
   = and U^i1  `[] = U^i1  x1     =, and so,
U^i1
 
`[]

U^i1
 
`[]
 = U^i1  x1
U^i1 (x1)
.
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Furthermore, again from equation (24), since U^i1
 
x1

=U^i1 (x^) =
=
 
1   =  U^i1  x1 =U^i1 (x^),
we have U^i1 (x^) =
h
 U^i1 (x^)
i
=
h
 U^i1
 
x1
i
=U^i1
 
x1

. Hence,
U^i1
 
`[]

U^i1
 
`[]
 = U^i1  x1
U^i1 (x1)
(25)
for all  6= .
Also to simplify notation, let z[] :=  [i1] + (1  )

i1

. Using this notation, case 2 implies
V
 
z[0]; `[0]
  V  z[1]; `[1] > V  z[1]; `[0] and V  z[1]; `[1] > V  z[0]; `[1]. Let v := V z[1]; `[] =
 (0). By independence over identity lotteries, V

z[]; `[]

= v for all .
By construction, for all  < , V
 
z[0]; `[]

> V

z[0]; `[]

> V
 
z[1]; `[]

; and for all  >
, V
 
z[0]; `[]

< V

z[0]; `[]

< V
 
z[1]; `[]

. By the a¢ nity of V (; `) on  (I), for all ,
V
 
z[]; `[]

is a¢ ne in . Thus there exists a unique  2 (0; 1) such that V  z[]; `[0] = v. That
is,
 
z[]; `[0]
  z[]; `[]. An immediate implication of independence over outcome lotteries is
that V
 
z[]; `[]

= v for all   . We claim that V  z[]; `[] = v for all . Suppose not: that is,
without loss of generality, there exists a  >  such that V
 
z[]; `[]

> v. Then, by independence
over outcome lotteries, by mixing with
 
z[]; `[0]

, we would have V
 
z[]; `[]

> v for all  > 0, a
contradiction. Thus, V
 
z[]; `[]

= v for all .
We can solve for  using the denition of V and the fact that


U^i1
 
x1

+ (1  )

U^i1
 
x1

= 

U^i1 (x^)

+ (1  )

U^i1 (x^)

.
Hence,
 =


U^i1
 
x1
  U^i1 (x^)


U^i1 (x^)

  

U^i1 (x
1)

+



U^i1 (x1)

  

U^i1 (x^)
 .
By the denition of , we have

h
U^i1
 
`[]
i
+ (1  )
h
U^i1
 
`[]
i
= v (26)
for all . By the a¢ nity of U^ , we have U^i1
 
`[]

= U^i1 (x^) + (1  ) U^i1
 
x1

and U^i1
 
`[]

=
U^i1 (x^)+(1  ) U^i1
 
x1

. Since this holds for all  and since  is di¤erentiable almost everywhere,
we have
0
h
U^i1
 
`[]
i 
U^i1 (x^)  U^i1
 
x1

+ (1  )0
h
U^i1
 
`[]
i 
U^i1 (x^)  U^i1
 
x1

= 0 (27)
31
at almost all .
Indeed, for all  6=  such that U^i1
 
`[]

and U^i1
 
`[]

lie in

U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1

, we can use
our homogenous expression for  and obtain:
0
h
U^i1
 
`[]
i
= K0
h
U^i1
 
`[]
i
, (28)
where K := (1  )

U^i1
 
x1
  U^i1 (x^) = h U^i1 (x^)  U^i1  x1i is a constant (that is, K does
not depend on ).
Since  is a power function we have by plugging in (23) to expression (28), for  > ,
kC+

U^i1
 
`[]
k 1
= KkC 

 U^i1
 
`[]
k 1
.
This reduces to "
U^i1
 
`[]

 U^i1
 
`[]
#k 1 = KC 
C+
.
Similarly for for  < ,
kC 

 U^i1
 
`[]
k 1
= KkC+

U^i1
 
`[]
k 1
.
This reduces to "
 U^i1
 
`[]

U^i1
 
`[]
 #k 1 = KC+
C 
.
But, by expression (25), the ratio on the left side of both these expressions is equal to U^i1
 
x1

=U^i1
 
x1

for all  6= . Thus we have shown that C+ = C . 
Step 5 extends the argument to cover the interval
h
U^i2 (x2) ; U^i2 (x2)
i
. So far we have shown
that  must have the form given in Lemma 9 that is, an a¢ ne transformation of a homogenous
function on the interval
h
U^i1
 
x1

; Ui1
 
x1
i
. We next show that the same function extends overh
U^i2 (x2) ; U^i2 (x2)
i
.
We can repeat Step 2 through Step 4 above focussing on the interval
h
U^i2 (x2) ; U^i2 (x2)
i
. The
argument is the same except that we need to be careful about the normalization that set u = 0
prior to Step 3. Since we are re-normalizing a second time, we have to keep track of how this
second re-normalization is related to the rst.
In particular, to be consistent with our notational convention above, let
h
U^i
i
i2I
and  be the
individual levels and -function given the normalization that set u = 0 above. In these utility
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units, let the utility level that is analogous to u (see expression (8) for the denition) for our
analysis of the interval
h
U^i2 (x2) ; U^i2 (x2)
i
be u2. Denote our re-normalized utility function for
each individual i by ~Ui (`) := U^i (`)   u2 (so that the utility level u2 is re-normalized to zero as
before). For each utility level u, let ~u denote the corresponding re-normalized individual utility
level and let ~ denote the correspondingly re-normalized -function. Then, we can re-normalize
~ such that for all u in R, ~ [~u] = ~ [(u  u2)] =  [u].
By repeating Steps 2 to 4, we know that ~ [~u] must have a form analogous to that in Lemma
9 on the interval
h
U^i2 (x2) ; U^i2 (x2)
i
. With slight abuse of notation, we can keep track of the
re-normalization by writing
~ (u) =
8>><>>:
~C [u  u2]~k + ~D u  u2  0
  ~C (  (u  u2))~k + ~D u  u2 < 0
.
By Lemma 6, we know that
h
U^i2 (x2) ; U^i2 (x2)
i
\
h
U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1
i
has a non-empty interior.
Thus, the ~ (u) and  (u) must coincide on this interval. Clearly, if either function were a¢ ne,
then both functions must be a¢ ne and we would be done. Suppose then that k 6= 1 and ~k 6= 1.
We will show that this implies that u2 = 0; that is, the two normalizations must be the same.
Suppose rst that the overlap
h
U^i2 (x2) ; U^i2 (x2)
i
\
h
U^i1
 
x1

; U^i1
 
x1
i
contains a subinterval
in which both u > 0 and u  u2 > 0. Then we know that
~C [u  u2]~k + ~D = Cuk +D (29)
for all u in that subinterval. Di¤erentiating yields
~k ~C [u  u2]~k 1 = kCuk 1:
Notice that if k = ~k = 2, then we would have [u  u2] =u = C= ~C and, since the right side is
constant, this implies u2 = 0. Therefore, assume that k 6= 2 or ~k 6= 2. Di¤erentiating again,
dividing the second derivative by the rst, and rearranging yields
[u  u2]
u
=
~k   1
k   1 .
But again the right side is constant, implying that u2 = 0. The argument on subintervals where
either u < 0 or u  u2 < 0 is similar.
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Since u2 = 0 (if k 6= 1), the rst derivative reduces to uk ~k = ~k ~C=kC. But again the right
side is a constant. Hence k = k, so that ~k ~C=kC = uk ~k = 1. Therefore C = ~C. Finally, using
expression (29), we obtain D = ~D. In other words, the two functions  and ~ must be the same.

Step 6 completes the proof by showing that k = 1. To do this, we invoke our third richness
condition, three-player richness.
Recall from the proof of Lemma 9, for the outcome lottery `[] :=
 [x^] +
 
1   x1, we
had U^i1

`[]

=U^i1

`[]

. That is,

i1; `[]



i1; `[]

. Hence, by three-player richness, there
exists another individual {^ such that

{^; `[]



i1; `[]

. That is, U^{^

`[]

6= 0. Consider the
graphs of U^i1
 
`[]

and U^{^
 
`[]

as functions of  2[0; 1] to R. Both are lines. The rst passes
through the point
 
; 0

, while the second does not. And, by the denitions of x1, x^ and i1,
the line U^i1
 
`[]

is strictly decreasing. Suppose that U^{^

`[]

> 0 the argument for the case
U^{^

`[]

< 0 is similar. Then, we can nd  and 0 such that 0 <  < 0 <  and such that the
vectors

U^i1
 
`[]

; U^{^
 
`[]
 0 and U^i1  `[0] ; U^{^  `[0] 0. Moreover, since U^{^ `[] 6= 0,
these vectors are not colinear.
By the a¢ nity of  1  V (Lemma 8), for all z; `; `0 and all ,
 1
"X
i
zi
h
U^i (`) + (1  ) U^i (`0)
i#
=  1
"X
i
zi
h
U^i (`)
i#
+ (1  ) 1
"X
i
zi
h
U^i (`
0)
i#
. (30)
In particular, this must hold for z = (1=2)

i1

+(1=2) [^{], `[] and `[0]. Substituting in these values
along with our homogenous functional forms  (u) = Cuk +D and  1 (v) = [(v  D) =C]1=k, the
left side of expression (30) becomes:
 1

1
2


U^i1
 
`[]

+ (1  ) U^i1
 
`[0]

+
1
2


U^{^
 
`[]

+ (1  ) U^{^
 
`[0]

=  1

1
2
C

U^i1
 
`[]

+ (1  ) U^i1
 
`[0]
k
+

U^{^
 
`[]

+ (1  ) U^{^
 
`[0]
k
+D

=
1
21=k

U^i1
 
`[]

+ (1  ) U^i1
 
`[0]
k
+

U^{^
 
`[]

+ (1  ) U^{^
 
`[0]
k1=k
.
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And the right side of expression (30) becomes:
1
21=k
 


U^i1
 
`[]
k
+

U^{^
 
`[]
k1=k
+ (1  )

U^i1
 
`[0]
k
+

U^{^
 
`[0]
k1=k!
.
Combining these yields:
U^i1
 
`[]

+ (1  ) U^i1
 
`[0]
k
+

U^{^
 
`[]

+ (1  ) U^{^
 
`[0]
k1=k
= 

U^i1
 
`[]
k
+

U^{^
 
`[]
k1=k
+ (1  )

U^i1
 
`[0]
k
+

U^{^
 
`[0]
k1=k
. (31)
Notice that if =were replaced by , then expression (31) becomes the Minkowski inequality.
Recall that if the Minkowski inequality holds with equality (and the vectors involved are not
colinear), then k = 1. Since the vectors we chose were not colinear, we have k = 1, completing
the proof. 
Remark. Notice that our third richness condition, three-player richness, was only used in the last
step (Step 6) of the proof. Specically, it allowed us to construct vectors that were not colinear,
and hence to apply the Minkowski inequality.18
The previous step (Step 5) illustrates how our counterexample in section 5 relies on there
being two outcomes and two agents. Recall the construction of u. Starting from the intervalh
U^i1
 
x1

; Ui1
 
x1
i
, redistributive scope ensures there exists an outcome x^ such that (i1; x^)  
i1; x^

. Continuity then ensures there exists an outcome lottery `[] between x
1 and x^ such that
i1; `[]



i1; `[]

, and u corresponds to the utility level at that lottery. Similarly, starting
from the interval
h
U^i2 (x2) ; U^i2 (x2)
i
, redistributive scope ensures there exists an outcome x^2 such
that (i1; x^2) 
 
i1; x^2

and continuity ensures there exists an outcome lottery `[2] between x2
and x^2 such that

i2; `[2]



i2; `[2]

, and u2 corresponds to the utility level at that lottery.
An implication of Step 5 is that if u 6= u2, then  is a¢ ne. In the example, there are only two
outcomes and two agents, hence `[] and `[2] must be the same lottery, and therefore u and u2
are trivially equal. But in a world with three agents or three outcomes, such a coincidence is knife
edge.
18 Even here, we only need this condition if U^i1 (x^)  0. If U^i1 (x^) > 0, then we have
 
i1; x1
  (i1; x^) and 
i1; x1
   i1; x^. In this case, our rst richness condition (absence of unanimity) already implies that there exists
an {^ such that ({^; x^)   {^; x1 %  i1; x1, and hence that U^{^ `[] > 0.
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